The principle of division and the principle of indivisibility. The principle of division and the principle of indivisibility Subjective rights in the field of human rights are specific individual powers granted to each individual within the framework of rights-parameters that make up a group of fundamental rights and

D. V. Shmonin, A. G. Pogonyailo

Francisco Suarez on individuation

Francisco Suarez

F rancisco Suarez (1548-1617) played a significant role in the history of European philosophy. He created a metaphysical system, which became the last major form of medieval scholasticism. She had a serious impact on the thinkers of modern times: - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and others. "Metaphysical Reasoning" (1597), the main philosophical work of Suarez, is a kind of encyclopedia of scholastic thought; they deal with almost all the main issues that constituted the problems of philosophy of the Middle Ages.

An important place in the ontological doctrine of Suarez is occupied by the question of the relationship between essence and existence, which has been the focus of philosophical disputes for centuries, since it was associated (in a broad sense) with the fundamental question of being: what is existence as such? The ambiguity, bi-directionality of this initial metaphysical questioning (which, according to Heidegger's thought, while remaining unified, into the question of what it means to be and what it means to be something) is the core of the ontological problematics.

The source of the question of how essence and existence relate to each other was the Aristotelian definition, where essence is understood both as "first" ("this is") and as "second" (generic). In the neoplatonic commentaries on the Stagirite, the question of "two" entities is posed as a problem of ontological status general concepts, from where the medieval dispute about universals originates.
In the course of this dispute, a doctrine was formed, first of all, apparently, in Arab scholasticism, about the so-called "real difference" between essence and existence and posed the question of what makes "this thing" "this thing", matter or form (the principle of individuation). It is interesting to see how the philosopher, who is an older contemporary of Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, resolves this issue, who revives the genre of scholastic "sums" at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, as if summing up everything that was said before him.

The doctrine of essence and existence, of the principle of individuation, which is contained in Metaphysical Discourses, Suarez begins, as required by the “order of work,” by setting out the points of view of other thinkers. He attributes the first of them to Thomas Aquinas. It is well known: in any of the created beings, essence and existence are two ontologically different things.

In order to better understand what Suarez is talking about, let us recall some points from the teachings of St. Thomas. Being (esse) in the metaphysics of Aquinas is the first stage of creation. God is understood in Thomism as actus purus, only in him essence and existence are merged into one. In the objects of the created world, they are two really different things.

In his treatise On Being and Essence, Thomas notes that only in God “essence is his very being”, while the essences of created substances are not identical with their existence. We can say that "essence" and "existence" here, as it were, define being from different sides: existence is an act in which essence is actually embodied. However, the “common root”, in the words of P.P. Gaidenko, of essence and existence does not prevent the “angelic doctor” from imparting an ontological character to their difference. The created world, according to Thomas, is a certain hierarchy of beings, the degree of perfection of which decreases with the distance along the “steps of being” from the Creator.

The second point of view described by Suarez belongs to the "subtle doctor" John Duns Scotus. One of the key concepts in Scott's ontology is the notion of the uniqueness of being. This concept goes back to Aristotelian "Categories", where there is the idea of synonymy of things (not words): entities are "synonymous" if they have the same names in the same sense. For the "subtle doctor" this means that being has the same meaning in all beings, including in God (which contradicts Thomism, where the verb "to be" used in relation to the Creator and in relation to the created world, means different things).

Heidegger understands being in Scotus as "a constant feature of everything objective": "Being is preserved unchanged in any object, no matter how much it is differentiated in its substantial completeness ...".

From the thesis about the uniqueness of being, it follows that in created things there is a formal or modal - not ontological, as in Thomas - a distinction between essence and existence, according to which existence is only a modus of essence (modus as an ontological term for Scot is a way, a specific version of existence).

We note right away that Suarez refuses to accept both of these opinions. He denies the ontological nature of the difference between essence and existence, which Thomas insists on, but he is also not satisfied with the position of Duns Scotus.

Suarez accepts the third of his views, which he attributes to Alexander Galsky (1170 / 80-1245) and the nominalists: essence and existence become different only in reason (tantum ratione). At the same time, he makes an important observation that only "real entities" and "real existence" are subject to strict consideration of the mind; in other words, although discrimination is an action of the intellect, the object under study must either exist in reality or have the "ability" to do so (aptitude ad existendum). This limitation gives meaning to the mental operation of distinguishing essence and existence of essence and existence (distinctio rationis) and provides it with the necessary basis in reality (fundamentum inre).

Suarez's appeal to Alexander of Galsky, one of the founders of the Franciscan school, requires attention, since the similarity of their positions is not so obvious. Alexander, discussing the problem of essence and existence, relies on the already established in the XII-XIII centuries. terminology. So Guillaume Auvergne (1180-1249), Alexander's friend at the University of Paris, uses whole line similar pairs of concepts: esse - quod est, quo est - quod est, ens ut nomeneus ut participium (which is later found in Suarez), ens necessariym - ens posibile; the opposition esse-essentia could complete the list.

In the treatise Magisterium Divinale, Guillaume writes that “... the simple [existence] has as something one its esse and its quod est. This is the same as saying that in this truly simple ... there is no difference between quod est and quo est or esse (De Universe. 2.2.S.). By truly simple God is meant; any created being "... is composed in some way of quod est and quo est or esse" (Ibid.). This happens in the same way that white becomes white thanks to a particular object and whiteness as such.

In Guillaume of Auvergne, by the way, in the same chapter of the treatise, one can find the remark that the existence of beings other than God, "... is separable according to ... reason or according to intellect" (Ibid.). Perhaps behind this reasoning is the closeness of the positions of Guillaume and Suarez.

In the "Sum of Theology" by Alexander Galsky, the problem of essence and existence is also presented in terms of quo est - quod est, and the incommensurability of creative and created being is also emphasized. Only in God is quod est, i.e. “First essence” and quo est as being-esse are identical, in any created thing quo est and quod est are different. Namely, this is what Thomas asserts, deriving from this his famous “analogy of being” (analogia entis): “being” affects God and creature not identically or differently, but analogously, so that the word “to be” changes its meaning depending on the one to whom or what being is attributed to, God or creature.

God is the very essence of existence, connecting essence and existence in creatures, in fact, creating them.

It should be noted that, probably, some blurring of concepts is affected here. For Alexander, esse, whose meaning practically coincides with quo est, does not have the “being” of Thomas Aquinas as the first stage of creation; rather, Alexander interprets esse-quo est as universal essence, universal nature (essentia). And outwardly coinciding with the Thomistic distinction quod est - quo est in Alexander, as it were, “does not leave the limits of essence,” turns out to be a purely logical, conceptual distinction between essence and existence. It is on this "intellectualism" of Alexander and thinkers close to him that Suarez seems to be oriented.

Let us return to the formulation of Suarez, who believes that essence and existence both in God and in created beings cannot be separated otherwise than through distinctio rationis cum fumdamento in re. The development of reasoning on this topic is carried out against the background of the central idea of suarism, the idea of the direct creation of things by God from nothing (creatio ex nihilo). Since the peculiarities of Suarez's understanding of the act of creation largely determine his interpretation of the opposition in question, this issue requires some clarification.

Unlike Thomas, Suarez shifts the emphasis from the godlike nature of created beings, who are “at different levels of being,” to their direct connection with a single supreme cause. Creation is carried out by absolutely free will, not according to ideas, generic entities, universals, predetermined forms, etc. The Creator does not need samples; he creates individual things directly and out of nothing. Therefore, in the Suarezian concept, there is no real separation between abstract entities and concretely existing things, between essence and existence. And although the main reasoning on this issue unfolds in 31 reasoning, already in the second reasoning Suarez emphasizes the formal nature of the distinction, which is demonstrated in terms of the traditional pair of concepts that was already present in Alexander of Galsky and Guillaume of Auvergne, ens ut participium - ens ut nomen.

The first meaning (ens ut participium) is obtained when in ens, the participle of the verb “to be,” emphasizes its “verb”, in this sense, “existing” means actual being, actual existence. “Thus, strictly speaking, the verb“ to be ”contains the expression of its own participle, in which the stated statement is permitted” (D.M.2.4.).

The second meaning, "being" as a name, defines the formal essence of a thing that exists or is capable of existing. In this meaning, “existing” is understood as something that has a certain essence (nature), which can manifest itself in real life. Existence as a name, therefore, refers not so much to specific things as to their natures, essences.

In the 5th reasoning, the philosopher explains his point of view in terms of the dispute about universals: "The general essence (species or genus - Auth.) And a specific thing (tntitas singularis) do not differ, but only in reason" (Ibid.5.3.). At the same time, he notes that what are called universals truly exists in things (res, quae universales denominantur, vere in re existunt): “We do not invent them with the power of reason, but rather we cognize (find) in things (in rebus esse intelligimus ) ”(Ibid.).

The Thomist Suarez's sympathy for nominalism is quite understandable: from his point of view, nominalists can be reproached for only one, inaccurate presentation of their thoughts. The meaning of the statements is reduced, in general, to the fact that the knowledge of universals is possible only in the mind. Nominalism, therefore, does not interfere with true knowledge. common entities, which are contained and manifested in individuals, in concrete being.

In 31 reflections during the discussion of the views of the previous thinkers, which were discussed, Suarez argues his position. In particular, he says that the principle that constitutes and defines something as real being cannot be something internally different, from which it follows that essence and existence cannot be internally different. Suarez also opposes the simple identification of esse with ens in actu and essentia with ens in potentia, since the understanding of existence as actuality (actualitas), and essence as a possibility does not say anything about their separate existence, but only draws a line between what is and what is not, but what can be. Finally, Suarez clearly separates the metaphysical concept of the identities of essence and existence in concrete beings from the concepts of the physical combination of form and matter in the objects of the created world. The "dismemberment" of this metaphysical unity is possible only by analogy with matter and form for the convenience of the human mind, limited in its capabilities. We can say that in the act of creation, the actualization of a concrete essence in the metaphysical plane corresponds to the physical combination of matter and a specific form. Divine will simultaneously and directly leads to the existence of the individual ("this person") and to specification - the species limitation, which answers the question "Quod est?"

Thus, in "Metaphysical Discourses" Suarez comprehensively considers the problem of essence and existence, citing various proofs of their ontological unity with logical ("in terms of cognition") difference. The meaning of this interpretation of the traditional scholastic distinction is revealed in the Suarezian concept of the unity of being and in the doctrine of the principle of individuation.

The philosopher distinguishes between three levels of manifestation of the unity of being (recall that unity, truth, goodness are three universal properties of being, which are considered in detail in the Middle Ages, starting with Philip the Chancellor (1160-1236)): 1) individual, 2) formal, and 3) universal.

Individual unity, according to Suarez, is what constitutes the individual as such and is its own, unique for each existing or capable of existing. “Each individual thing is numerically one,” the philosopher emphasizes.
Formal unity belongs to the nature (essence) of an individual thing. All individuals of the same species belong to the same entity. From this a formal (genus-specific) unity is deduced, which, like the individual unity, is actually contained in the things themselves and determines - at the level of specification - their uniqueness.

The two indicated levels of unity do not differ ontologically, since the common nature is actually present only in the “first essences”; distinction is possible only analytically, with the help of distinctio rationis.

Universal unity is formed only through mental operations that abstract general concepts - “intentional types” from everything concrete, individual.

The unity of being is the unity of essence and existence in any being, in a single thing, which, as Suarez says, is internally limited by its essence, and externally - by God in the act of creation. The essence determines itself, proceeding from the Divine plan, and existence is determined by the fact that it is the existence of the given essence in a certain way, established by the will of the Creator in the act of creation (D.M.13.13).

Every individual is unique due to the fact that he is directly created by God and endowed in his being with a unique combination of essence and existence. This point of view not only takes Suarez out of the framework of the traditionally understood question of essence and existence and ends this discussion, making at the same time meaningless further polemics of realism and nominalism about the nature of general concepts; but it also becomes a connecting link between traditional scholasticism and modern European metaphysics, primarily the teachings of Descartes and Leibniz.

In direct dependence on the solution of the cardinal problems of scholastic philosophy - the relationship between essence and existence, potency and act, uncreated and created being, free will and predestination, etc. a solution to the question of what makes a thing "this thing" is found, i.e. this or that understanding of individuation.

The problem of individuation arises when and where and when the question of being, constituting the entire content of metaphysics - what does it mean to be, after all, every thing is, but nowhere apart from things we do not find this “is” - they begin to solve “physically”. Namely: they are looking for a certain thing-being, which, contrary to Aristotle's remark that the essence cannot exist separately and that of which it is the essence, somehow still exists "separately" from the things themselves.

Having postulated the existence of such a thing-being, one thinks about how it descends into concrete things, “descends” to them. In Thomas Aquinas, such an individualizing principle turns out to be matter, moreover, not primary matter, which, due to its indeterminacy, is unable to define and concretize anything, but the so-called "Signified", already determined matter, and, quantitatively determined (materia quantitate signata), not bone in general and flesh in general, but "this bone" and "this flesh":

“And therefore one should know that the principle of individuation is not all matter, understood in any way, but only designated matter (materia signata); moreover, the designated matter I call such matter, which is considered in certain dimensions. Meanwhile, in the definition of man - since he is a man - we do not assume such matter, but it would be assumed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. " Albertus Magnus and Guillaume of Auvergne solved the problem of individuation in a similar way.

In contrast, the scholastics associated with the Augustinian tradition consider form to be the beginning of individuation. So, St. Bonaventure believes that an individual or this unique thing is formed as a kind of communication between matter and form, in which matter is determined by form, and is a hoc aliquid, where hoc is matter, and aliquid is form (In Sent. SHLO.1.3.) - An original solution, unlike the others, was proposed by Dune Scotus, apparently, it came to him in the course of a dispute with the Thomistic principle of analogy of existence. Scott himself asserts that neither matter nor form can act as an individualizing principle, but that there is a certain “general nature” (form and matter together), which is contracted, concretized in individuals, who are “the last reality of existence,” the last definiteness of form, matter and their unity. The individual is not characterized by simplicity, he is composed, complex and comprehensively defined (Op.okh.P.3.5.1.). Although such a decision cannot be called nominalist, in essence it is very difficult to distinguish it from the nominalism of late scholasticism, in particular, from Occam's.

Suarez rejects all of the above decisions. Neither matter, nor form, nor the haecceitas of Duns Scotus suit him as a principle of individuation, although it would seem that all the logical paths of individualization have been exhausted. However, Suarez finds his own solution. Remaining apparently faithful to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, one of the grounds of which was the so-called real separation of essence and existence (without which, obviously, the problem of individuation itself disappears, and which is necessary for Thomas to build a hierarchy of beings according to the principle of analogy) and rejecting the teachings of Scotus about the "uniqueness of being", Suarez understands his "analogy" in a completely different way from Thomas. In Aquinas, God united essence and existence, being Himself an existing essence, and thus created the world. Suarez maintains the position that God is self-existent (ens a se), that He exists in essence; nevertheless, created being exists “from the other” (ab alio), by the participle. But the philosopher explains the creation itself as simultaneously the creation of individuals from nothing, the essences and existence of which can be distinguished only in thought and do not exist separately from each other. Thus, Suarez explicitly denies the real separation of essence and existence, getting the opportunity to say that essence and existence are not two different things in created things, and every creature is a finite, existing essence, defined from within its own (created by God together with its existence) nature and from without by the fact that its existence is given by the divine act of creation. God creates individuals - this is what Suarez claims, God always creates "everything" (completely, entirely) of the being of his creation, which is determined and limited from the inside by his own nature, and from the outside - by the acting cause (D.M.5.I.4.). With this interpretation of the principle of individuation, Suarez actually completes its long history, simply showing its uselessness: if the initial conditions in which this question arose have disappeared, then any of its decisions have lost their meaning; but at the same time a new history of the principle of individuation is opening up.

In this new - new European - understanding, individuation appears as a comprehensive definiteness of a concrete thing, which precisely because of the infinity of definitions (it is necessary to determine all connections, to reveal all the relations that make this thing this thing) and turns out to be leaving, escaping from final definiteness. Thus, the principle of division is a principle that requires (as a logical operation) the unity of the basis when classifying, comparing, etc. different things (it is impossible to compare a wheel with a red one), and the principle of indivisibility coincide: a thing - "this thing" in the fullness - unattainable - of its definitions; a substance, an atom, an individual is not something that cannot be divided, not something simple, indivisible, but something that is not limited to one, two, three, many definitions, that which, being included in one system of relations, can be included - and really included - in an infinite number of others. Leibniz speaks about this most clearly of all, explaining the idea of a complete (expanded) concept of a concrete being:

“Being (ens),” writes the philosopher, “is that, the concept of which contains something positive, or that can be understood by us, ... and we recognize something understandable only when its concept is fully developed (axpplicatus) and not will contain nothing unclear. " In "New Experiments on Human Understanding" Leibniz notes, "... that individuality contains infinity, and only those who are able to embrace it can have knowledge of the principle of individuation of this or that thing." Leibniz's follower Wolff speaks of existence determined in all respects; this is also where the Hegelian concept of the "universal individual" originates.

Magazine "Beginning" No. 3-4 1996

This refers primarily to the text of Porfiry and Boethius's commentary on it. See: Boethius. Commentary on Porfiry. // Consolation by philosophy. M., 1990.

The Society of Jesus, founded in the middle of the 16th century. Ignatius Loyola, with a focus on educational, pedagogical, missionary activities, active participation of members of the order in worldly (including state) affairs, quickly gained a great influence on the political and spiritual life of not only Catholic, but also Protestant countries. More about the role of the Jesuit order in the history of Europe in the 16th-17th centuries. see: V. Rozhkov, Essays on the history of the Roman Catholic Church. 4.1. M., 1994.

De Legibus, a ten-volume work on all forms of law, published by Suarez in 1612, apparently became the basis for the more famous analysis of the theory of law by G. Grotius, published 12 years later.

In the course of heterogeneous political processes that accompanied the ideological struggle of supporters and opponents of the Reformation, not only the "modernization" of the Catholic Church took place, but significant shifts in socio-economic relations, new approaches to politics, law, democratic freedoms, etc. , the world has entered the New Time.

Against this background, the fact of close attention to the Spanish philosopher by M. Heidegger is interesting, who examines the metaphysical doctrine of Suarez in his "Marburg Lectures" of 1927 and devotes a paragraph to it in his work "Basic Concepts of Metaphysics". According to Heidegger, he (Suarez) "... should be put even higher than Thomas ..." because he "... laid the foundation for the independent development of metaphysical problems, which were especially influential ... for the emerging philosophy of modern times." (Heidegger M. Basic concepts of metaphysics. // Problems of Philosophy. 1989.№9., P.153).

Thomas Aquinas. About existence and essence. // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook - 88., pp. 246-247.

The quote is given by V.V. Bibikhin in the book: Works by E. Gilson on cultural studies and the history of thought. Issue 2. M., 1988, p. 84.

Everything that cannot be called “real” or “having a basis in reality, Suarez does not include in the subject of metaphysics, but considers it to be connected with it and considers in the final 54 reasoning.

Quotes from Alexander of Galsky and Guillaume of Auvergne used in this article, cited by: Beuchot M. La distinction entre esentia y existencia en los escolasticos, anteriores a Tomas de Aquino.// Revista de filosofia. Mexico. 1986 / Num. 55.

Cit. by: Suarez Fr. MetaphysicarumDisputationum. T. 1-2. Venetiis, 1619.

It is known that Descartes, who studied at the Jesuit school "La Flèche", carefully studied the works of Suarez. Throughout his life, he retained affection for them and did not go on the road without a volume containing one or more of the Metaphysical Discourses. Leibniz, who spoke of scholasticism without much respect, singled out Suarez and noted that reading the works of the latter was given to him with the ease and pleasure with which one usually reads novels.

Thomas Aquinas. Op. Cit. p. 233.

"This is something" (lat).

"Ethnost" (lat.).

Leibniz G.V. On the method of distinguishing real from imaginary phenomena. // Op. in 4 volumes.T.Z M., 1984.S. 110.

Leibniz G.V. New Experiments on Human Understanding. // Ibid. T.2. P.291.

See: Wolf X. Reasonable thoughts about the powers of the human mind and their correct use in the knowledge of the truth. SPb., 1765.№ 74.

See: Hegel G.V. F. The phenomenology of the spirit. SPb., 1992. P.14.

The human rights challenges posed by globalization are on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, which regularly adopts resolutions entitled “Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights” 277. These resolutions state, inter alia, that globalization is not only an economic process, but has social, political, environmental and cultural dimensions that have an impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights. They recognize that while globalization offers great opportunities, the benefits are very unevenly shared, as are all costs. The documents express concern at the widening gap between developed and developing countries, and within countries, and indicate that this gap has exacerbated the problem of poverty, which has a negative impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights, especially in developing countries. In addition, it emphasizes that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, and that the international community must address human rights globally, in a fair and equal manner, with the same approach and attention.

Meeting the challenges posed by globalization is closely linked to the realization of all human rights. It is necessary not only to declaratively proclaim the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, but also to actually create conditions and mechanisms that would effectively protect all human rights. As H. Bsngoa points out, in the period after the Second World War there were two main forms of "democracy", one of which reflected liberal ideas about democracy and highlighted electoral democracy and civil rights, and the other was based on ideas about socio-economic democracy. with a planned economy. The first concept was reflected in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the second - in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These two approaches to some extent restrained the broad processes of globalization that were emerging in both parts of the world. After the elimination of these barriers, the processes of globalization, without encountering any obstacles, took on an uncontrolled and clearly

uncontrollable character

With the end of the existence of the socialist bloc and the further development of globalization, we have to admit that at present in international relations the neoliberal approach prevails. This approach reflects the position of developed countries and is dominant in the activities of the most influential non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights issues - Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. This approach, based on a narrow concept of human rights that predominantly implies civil and political rights, is misleading

2p See: Doc. UN E / CN.4 / Sub.2f1998 / 8. P. 25.

on the causes of inequality and contributes to its strengthening, overlooks the systematic violation of the social and economic rights of billions of people, without which it is difficult to talk about the dignity of the individual, and also complicates the realization of the right to development in third world countries.

In addition, this approach contributes to the disintegration of society and comes into conflict with the provisions of a number of international legal documents, including the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the preamble of which states that “the ideal of a free human person who enjoys civil and political freedom and freedom of fear and need, can be realized only if such conditions are created under which everyone can enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights, as well as their civil and political rights. " If the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is not ensured, then civil and political rights are reduced to the level of meaningless formal categories and, conversely, economic, social and cultural rights alone in the absence of real civil and political rights are not enough to ensure genuine freedom and dignity of the individual. Therefore, the debate about which rights prevail - rights arising from the principle of freedom, or rights arising from the principle of equality - is devoid of any meaning. As L.I. Glukhareva, “the complex of rights and freedoms is universal, objective, non-selective and indivisible, as all aspects of the human

In our opinion, theories based on the narrow concept of human rights are not able to ensure respect human dignity and the protection of all human rights for all people in the whole world, as well as they are unable to solve the problems that impede the realization of the right to development in third world countries. Given that billions of people around the world currently live in extreme poverty, with little opportunity to change this situation, such theories only discredit the very idea of human rights.

™ Glukhareva L.I. Human rights in modern world(socio-philosophical foundations and state legal regulation). M .: Jurist, 2003.S. 34.

It seems, therefore, that the basis for overcoming negative consequences globalization for human rights must be based on the concept of the indivisibility of human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and confirmed in the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993, as well as in the Millennium Declaration.

Art. 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a provision according to

to which everyone has the right to a social and international order,

in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully

implemented. As you know, the Declaration is not limited to listing only

civil and political rights, but also establishes that everyone has

the right to such a standard of living, including food, clothing, housing, medical

care and necessary social services that are necessary for

maintaining the health and well-being of himself and his family, and the right to

provision in case of unemployment, illness, disability, widowhood,

the onset of old age or other case of loss of livelihood for

circumstances beyond his control (clause 1 of article 25). In this sense, as X.

Bengoa, economic, social and cultural rights form an "ethical

border "between life in human society and life outside of human

society, and in the process of globalization, these rights acquire a new meaning and should

considered as a set of fundamental rights that set limits

globalization 250. He points out that “naive belief in a certain

the predetermination of the fate of children and adults living in a monstrous

poverty in third world countries is not justified by any logic and common sense 281

MEANING ".

More on topic 4.2. The concept of the indivisibility of all human rights as a means of overcoming the problems generated by globalization: